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YOU CAN'T GET THERE FROM HERE: IGRA NEEDS
REINVENTION INTO A RELEVANT STATUTE FOR A
MATURE INDUSTRY
ANTONIA COWAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Congress created a legislative compromise with the
enactment the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).1 The statute
sought to appease conflicting positions on Indian gaming. Several
states wanted to impose state law on the gambling then taking place
on Indian reservations. The states with land-based casino gaming
interests did not want what they viewed as unfair competition from
Indian casinos.2 Indian land-based gaming that was not subject to
state law was viewed by the tribes as consistent with their
sovereignty. 3
Passage of IGRA divided gambling into three "classes," each to
be regulated at different levels of scrutiny by different federal, state,
* B.A., Pennsylvania State University, M.A., New York University, J.D., Villa-
nova University School of Law. Antonia Z. Cowan is an associate with Catania
Gaming Consultants and a former Senior Attorney at the New Jersey Casino Con-
trol Commission, and the Nevada Attorney General's Office, Division of Gaming.
Her expertise is in state gaming compliance, Internet gaming, and federal Indian
gaming compliance.
1. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2701-21 (West 2010).
2. The term "land-based" gaming is used to differentiate the casinos and ca-
sino gambling discussed in this paper from Internet casinos and Internet gaming
law which is not within the scope of this article. "Land-based" means "existing in a
physical place rather than as a website." MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, MACMILLAN PUB-
LISHERS LIMITED (2010), available at http://www.macmillandictionary.com/diction-
ary/british/land-based.
3. See National Indian Gaming Commission, Indian Land Opinions, http://
www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/IndianLandOpinions/tabid/120/Default.aspx (last
visited April 3, 2010) (providing theories of various tribes regarding why gaming
not subject to state law). The Commission uses both the terms "reservation" and
"Indian Lands" as follows:
Indian tribes may only game on Indian lands that are eligible for gaming
under the IGRA. Such lands must meet the definition of "Indian lands"
at 25 U.S.C. § 2703, which requires that the land be within the limits of a
tribe's reservation, be held in trust by the United States for the benefit of
the tribe or its member(s), or that the land be subject to restrictions
against alienation by the United States for the benefit of the tribe or its
member(s). Additionally, the tribe must have jurisdiction and exercise
governmental powers over the gaming site.
Id.
(309)
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or tribal governmental entities. 4 This division was based on the na-
ture of the game bingo and other Class II games as played at the
time.5 Slot machines and all other gambling, including house-
banked traditional casino games, were put in a residual category,
Class III, and only made legal as authorized by a tribal/state
compact.6
Congress has never amended IGRA since it became law. 7 Inno-
vations in gaming technology and market demands have made the
IGRA Class II and Class III categories of gambling a hopeless anach-
ronism. 8 Nevertheless, the IGRA classes still determine what type of
gambling can take place on Indian land.9 Class II gaming can be
regulated by tribes who have no obligation to pay a share of pro-
ceeds to the state. 10 Class III Indian gaming can only be operated
under a negotiated tribal/state compact.11 Negotiated tribal/state
compacts for Class III gaming usually include an agreement by the
tribe to contribute to state revenue from the proceeds of the
operation.12
4. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2703(6)-(8) (West 2010) (providing definitions for dif-
ferent Classes of gaming).
5. See S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 3071 (1988) (discussing division of act based on
the nature of certain games).
6. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(8) (West 2010) (defining Class III as containing "all
forms of gaming that are not Class I gaming or Class II gaming"); see also 25 C.F.R.
§ 502.11 (2010) ("House banking game means any game of chance that is played
with the house as a participant in the game, where the house takes on all players,
collects from all losers, and pays all winners, and the house can win.").
7. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West 2010) (providing date passed).
8. See Courtney J. A. DaCosta, Note, When "Turnabout" is Not "Fair Play ": Tribal
Immunity Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 97 GEo. L.J. 515, 549 (2009) (pro-
posing necessary reforms for IGRA).
9. See id. at 521-22 (providing background and describing Congress' purpose
in passing IGRA).
10. See Wendy J. Johnson, Tribal Gaming Expansion in Oregon, 37 WILLAMETrE
L. REv. 399, 411 (2001) (explaining states have limited jurisdiction).
11. See id. at 412 (describing procedural steps for Class III gaming).
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage,
keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ci. 3 (emphasis added). IGRA provides for the Secretary of
the Interior to approve tribal/state compacts. SeeJohnson, supra note 10, at 412.
12. See Steve J. Coleman, Note, Lottery Logistics: The Potential Impact of a State
Lottery on Indian Gaming in Oklahoma, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 515, 537 (2003)
(describing how impact of giving proceeds to state revenue affected Oklahoma).
Moreover, the tribal-state compacting process allows the State to control
its own destiny in terms of revenue production .... In addition to al-
lowing the State to control the size of its "piece of the pie," tribes are
benefitted in the form of increased employment, improved education
and health care, and decreased member reliance on welfare.
[Vol. 17: p. 309
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This article proposes amendments to the IGRA that would re-
tain the federal policy of encouraging economic opportunities in
the gaming industry for all tribes, but recommends a replacement
of the obsolete differentiation between Class II and Class III gam-
bling with a more enforceable, quantitative standard that still allows
tribes to operate certain gaming without a tribal/state compact. 3
II. BACKGROUND
Gambling in America is older than the Mayflower. 14 Wagering
on sports and games was part of many Native American cultures
before European immigration.1 5  Additionally, gambling was
brought to the colonies by the European settlers.1 6 Even though
most early American colonies accepted gambling as a gentlemen's
social pastime and a convenient way to raise money for education
and revolution, other colonies, like those settled by the Puritans,
Id. (citation omitted).
13. See NIGC Announces 2008 Revenues, National Indian Gaming Commission,
(June 3, 2009), http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/PressReleases/PressReleases-
Main/PRI13062009/tabid/918/Default.aspx (reporting 2008 gaming revenues
before House).
Commission Chairman Phil Hogen, speaking at the annual conference of
the North American Gaming Regulators Association, reported that 2008
gross gaming revenue exceeded the industry's 2007 revenues by more
than $500 million. Gross gaming revenue totaled $26.7 billion, an in-
crease of 2.3% over the prior year
The data indicates that gaming revenues are not distributed equally
among the gaming tribes. Facilities with annual revenues of less than
$100 million constitute over 80% of the more than 400 operations, while
fewer than 20% of the operations generate about 70% of the $26.7 billion
in revenues.
Id. While IGRA clearly states that there is no authority given to a state to impose
any tax on an Indian tribe, nothing prevents a tribe from agreeing to the imposi-
tion of a payment to the state from gaming proceeds in the negotiations for a
tribal/state compact. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(4) (West 2010).
14. See Ed Crews, Gambling: Apple-Pie American and Older than the Mayflower, THE
COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG J., Autumn 2008, available at http://www.history.org/
Foundation/journal/Autumn08/gamble.cfm#webex (providing history of gam-
bling in Colonial Williamsburg).
15. See Michael E. Wheeler, One White Buffalo, Why Not Three?: Native
American Gaming in the Lone Star State, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 147, 148 (2007)
(providing concise history of Native American gaming or gambling); see also Mike
Roberts, The National Gambling Debate: Two Defining Issues, 18 WHITTIER L. REv. 579,
580-82 (1997) (outlining brief history of Native American gaming and religious or
social events).
16. See William E. Horwitz, Note, Scope of Gaming Under the Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act of 1988 After Rumsey v. Wilson: White Buffalo or Brown Cow?, 14 CARozo
ARTS & ENT. LJ. 153, 158-59 (1996) (claiming that non-Indians were invited to
participate in Indian games and vice versa).
2010]
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did not allow gambling. 17 The patchwork quilt that is legal gaming
in the United States today developed from this divergence of opin-
ion about gambling and from each state using Tenth Amendment
residual powers to enact various gambling laws. 18
The Tenth amendment has been interpreted to mean that "all
is retained which has not been surrendered.. . ."19 The regulation
or prohibition of gambling within a state has been regarded as a
matter of state police powers. 20 As a result of this broad state au-
thority, there are several states that allow most types of gambling,
two that ban gambling entirely, and all manner of different legal
treatment of gambling in between. 21
By 1931, Nevada had legalized full casino gambling. 22 By 1976,
New Jersey, which had the first modern successful state lottery, had
also legalized casino gambling in Atlantic City.2 3 For ten years,
these two jurisdictions enjoyed the distinction of being the only two
17. See Crews, supra note 14 (continuing account of gambling history in early
American colonies and describing dynamic with Indians and different European
religions).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.")
19. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that
it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and
state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before
the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the
new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and
that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Id. (emphasis added).
20. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224 (1905) ("The power of the state to
enact laws to suppress gambling cannot be doubted.").
21. See Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, The Hand That's Been Dealt:
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 20, 57 DRAKE L. REv. 413, 414-15 (2009) (noting
explosion of interest in gambling in tribes and states); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 3001 (a) (1) (West 2010) (acknowledging that "states should have the primary re-
sponsibility for determining what forms of gambling may legally take place within
their borders"). The two states that have banned gaming entirely are Utah and
Hawaii. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1221 (West 2010) (outlawing gambling
and describing penalties for statutory violation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1101
(West 2010) (outlining several illegal forms of gambling in Utah). Since lotteries
were the most prevalent form of gambling in the United States for a long period of
time, individual state constitutions may use the term "lotteries" as a generic term to
cover and prohibit "any game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise." UTAH CONST.
art. V, § 28. Some state constitutions mention specific forms of gambling that are
prohibited. See, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 24 (prohibiting lotteries).
22. See Roberts, supra note 15 at 585 (crediting end of regulation in 1931 to
Great Depression).
23. See id. at 586 (exploring rationale that New Jersey used gambling as type
of urban development); see also Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 819 F.
Supp. 1312, 1319 (D. N.J. 1993) (providing concise history of gaming in Atlantic
[Vol. 17: p. 309
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legalized casino gaming jurisdictions in the United States. It was
not until November 1988 that the next legalized gambling jurisdic-
tion came about when South Dakota amended its state constitution
to permit controlled stakes gambling. 24 Nevada and New Jersey's
use of casino-gambling proceeds to fund state government created
a domino effect; states quickly began sanctioning and even operat-
ing widespread gambling in a variety of forms. 25 Currently, every
state, except Utah and Hawaii, allows gambling in some form. 26
Generally, gambling has been left to the states to accept or re-
ject. During the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centu-
ries, Congress took a position against gambling by using its federal
power over interstate commerce.27 As soon as any new technology
was developed, Congress would pass prohibitory legislation con-
cerning its use for gambling.28 For example, upon the establish-
ment of the U.S. Mail and the inventions of the telegraph and
radio, all these methods of communication became the subject of
federal prohibition that curtailed gambling in interstate
commerce.
29
Congress also used anti-gambling statutes as an approach to
organized crime prosecutions.30 As recently as the 1960s and
1970s, a series of federal organized crime statutes were passed by
Congress that forbade criminals from making wagers using wire
City); NJ. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (providing that residents voted for amendment to
state constitution).
24. See Brooke Delores Swier, Comment, Gaming Goldmines Grow Green: Limited
Gaming, Good Faith Negotiations, and the Economic Impact of the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act in South Dakota, 54 S.D. L. REv. 493,505 (2009) (reporting that legislature
approved measures to legalize video lottery).
25. See Horwitz, supra note 16, at 157-58 (describing state legislatures embrac-
ing lotteries to fund state operations).
26. See Haw. Rev. Stat. ANN. § 712-1221 (West 2010) (banning gambling in all
its forms in Hawaii); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1101 (West 2010) (outlawing
several forms of gambling in Utah).
27. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176
(1999) (describing Congress' policy and attitude toward gambling.) "[Congress]
not only discouraged the operation of lotteries and similar schemes, but forbade
the dissemination of information concerning such enterprises by use of the mails,
even when the lottery in question was chartered by a state legislature."
28. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 425 (1993) (upholding
constitutionality of legislation from Congress banning gambling advertising by
broadcast radio).
29. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 176-78 (outlining Court's
history of finding federal legislation banning advertising for gambling
constitutional).
30. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 594 (commenting that both NewJersey and
Nevada passed legislation to stop organized crime which led to federal legislation).
2010]
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technology,3 1 traveling across state lines in furtherance of a gam-
bling enterprise, 32 and transporting wagering paraphernalia. 33 The
passage of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 which in-
cluded the Illegal Gambling Business Act 34 and the Racketeer Influ-
ence and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO) completed
the series designed to "eradicate organized crime by attacking the
sources of its revenue, such as syndicated gambling or bookmak-
ers. '3 5 The federal purpose of these criminal statutes was focused
on the disruption and reduction of organized crime operating
across multiple states. The statutes have resulted in multi-state fed-
eral organized crime prosecutions, while the prosecution of intra-
state illegal gambling enterprises has been left to the states. 36
As the twentieth century moved toward its end, federal legisla-
tion on gambling turned from being strictly prohibitive to being
simply regulatory. While there has been federal legislation prohib-
iting wagering on amateur sports,37 there have also been statutory
amendments to allow interstate lotteries upon a compact among
states involved 8 and to liberalize interstate wagering on
horseracing.3 9
31. SeeJeffery R. Rodefer, Internet Gambling in Nevada: Overview of Federal Law
Affecting Assembly Bill 466, 6 GAMING L. REv. 5, at 393415 (2002); see, e.g., The Wire
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084 (West 2010) (outlawing wire transfers). The Wire Act is
currently relied upon by the U.S. Justice Department to prohibit gambling over
the Internet. See Antonia Cowan, The Global Gaming Village: Interstate and Transna-
tional Gambling, 7 GAMING L. REv. 4 (2003).
32. See Rodefer, supra note 31, at 401 (detailing Travel Act); see, e.g., 18
U.S.C.A. § 1952 (West 2010) (outlawing traveling across state lines in furtherance
of illegal activity).
33. See Rodefer, supra note 31, at 402 (detailing Travel Act); see, e.g., 18
U.S.C.A. § 1953 (West 2010) (outlawing transport of gambling implements).
34. See Rodefer, supra note 31, at 403 (discussing both acts); see, e.g., 18
U.S.C.A. § 1955 (West 2010) (prohibiting illegal gambling businesses).
35. See Rodefer, supra note 31, at 404 (quoting act); see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1963,
1964 (West 2010) (providing criminal penalties and civil remedies for violations of
RICO).
36. See United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding
that federal government, relying on its authority over interstate commerce, had
jurisdiction over cross-state gambling). Section 1955 left the states with control of
enforcement efforts against smaller gambling operations that did not meet the
minimum jurisdictional requirements, though such businesses might be identical
to the others in every respect except size: "The intent of section 1511 and section
1955, below, is not to bring all illegal gambling activity within the control of the
Federal Government, but to deal only with illegal gambling activities of major pro-
portions." Id.
37. See Rodefer, supra note 31, at 397 (discussing wagering on amateur
sports).
38. See id. (detailing statutory amendments).
39. See id. (detailing statutory amendments).
[Vol. 17: p. 309
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A. The Structure As Built by IGRA
The nationwide expansion of legalized gambling took place as
the state matter it is, without federal prohibition or comprehensive
federal gambling regulatory policy except for IGRA.40 In passing
IGRA, without offense to the Tenth Amendment, the federal gov-
ernment acted not under its broad inter-state commerce power, but
rather, Congress enacted IGRA based on the federal government's
relationship to Native Americans as "domestic dependent
nations".41
Compared to the direct involvement of state or tribal regula-
tors under IGRA, the NIGC's role is very different.42 The federal
involvement is not the kind of close partnership between the indus-
40. The IGRA provides in Congressional findings that "Indian tribes have the
exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands." 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).
In the Declaration of Policy, the statutory language is: "to provide a statutory basis
for the regulation of gaming 6y an Indian tribe .. " 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (emphasis
added). The tribes draft their own gaming ordinances that are subject to Chair-
man of the NIGC's review for conformity with IGRA. NIGC also publishes a model
gaming ordinance available on its website. Obviously sensitive to IGRA's language
giving the tribe regulatory responsibility, the NIGC repeatedly differentiates its
own role as one of "oversight." See Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.nigc.gov/AboutUs/Frequently AskedQuestions/tabid/943/Default.aspx (last
visited March 30, 2010).
41. Philip J. Prygoski, From Marshall to Marshall, The Supreme Court's Changing
Stance on Tribal Sovereignty, ABA MAGAZINE (1995) available at http://
www.abanet.org/genpractice/magazine/1995/fall/marshall.html. Three cases are
known as the Marshall Trilogy: Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and
Worcesterv. Georgia. 21 U.S. 543 (1823); 30 U.S. 1 (1831); 31 U.S. 515 (1832). In
Johnson v. McIntosh, Chief Justice Marshall found that Indian tribes could not sell
their Indian Land to non-tribal members or entities without the consent of the
federal government. 21 U.S. at 543-62 (discussing facts of case). The Supreme
Court determined that tribal sovereignty and the concomitant right to convey its
land had been weakened by the immigration from Europe and the development of
the United States. See id. at 567-78 (discussing Court rational). In the second case
in the trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court ruled that Indian tribes were
"domestic dependent nations" existing in a state of "pupilage. Their relationship
to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 30 U.S. at 10-13.
Statements like these lead to the trust relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the Indians, which had been the justification for federal government's
intrusion in what could be considered strictly tribal affairs. In the last of the tril-
ogy, Worcester v. Georgia, the Court found that the Cherokee and their lands were a
distinct from the state of Georgia. 31 U.S. at 561-63. Chief Justice Marshall estab-
lished the policy that the states have no regulatory or taxing authority in Indian
country. See id. at 592-94 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's opinion on regula-
tion authority in Indian country).
42. For example, the NIGC does not issue or revoke gaming credentials. The
tribal gaming governmental entity has that responsibility within its jurisdiction.
The NIGC does not have a testing laboratory of its own but rather relies on inde-
pendent testing laboratory results obtained by the tribes. The NIGC has no role in
the negotiations for a tribal/state compact. States where gambling is legal have
policy in place concerning these functions.
2010]
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try and the regulators that has been so effective in Nevada, New
Jersey and other states based on those models. Although there
does not seem to be any substantive difference between the words
as used in other federal regulatory contexts, the NIGC is careful to
call its part as one of "oversight" rather than "regulation."43 The
NIGC determines types of gambling and directs the types to the
appropriate regulatory entities. Rather than setting out a compre-
hensive gaming regulatory policy itself, an option perhaps unavaila-
ble given the Tenth Amendment, the IGRA set forth a federal
gaming oversight system for Class II that is much like training
wheels on a bicycle. 44 The federal Class II oversight requires fully
reliable tribal regulation that must achieve a regulatory equilibrium
on its own while the federal system hovers nearby in case of a mis-
calculation. The direct responsibility for Class II gaming regulation
is the tribes with NIGC oversight. 45 For Class III, the tribes and the
states share responsibility for regulation pursuant to the terms of
the tribal/state compact and the NIGC has an even more minor
role in Class III operations. 4 6
43. Congressional Quarterly, Inc, Capitol Hill Hearing on Draft Legislation, Before the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Regulation of Indian Gaming, 110th Cong. 1 (2007)
(testimony by Philip N. Hogen, Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commis-
siori), available at http://indian.senate.gov/public/in-
dex.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&HearingID=ccf51 ba7-e82a-4f2a-9cbc-
elfb5b5e7dl0.
44. See Id.
45. See Frequently Asked Questions supra note 40 (discussing Indian gaming
regulation). As the NIGC explains in its Frequently Asked Questions, the tribes
and the states regulate while the federal government provides "oversight,":
Who regulates Indian gaming? Indian tribes are the primary regulators
of Class II gaming. Regulation of Class III gaming may be addressed in
the Tribal-State compacts and varies by state with the tribes remaining the
primary regulator in most states. Both Class II and Class III gaming are
subject to the provisions of the IGRA and oversight by the NIGC.
Id. When New Jersey was a novice to casino gaming, it did not develop its state
regulatory law in a vacuum but looked to Nevada's regulatory laws and then ex-
panded it. States that have legalized casino gaming more recently have had both
models, Nevada's and New Jersey's, to pick and chose which to adopt into their
own regulatory scheme.
46. See Congressional Quarterly, supra note 43, at 10.
Typically, the regulatory role a particular state undertakes in its compact
was taken from and modeled on that state's experience with the regula-
tion of its own legalized gaming at the time the compact was negotiated.
Where such states develop effective regulatory programs, the need for
NIGC oversight is greatly reduced. For example, in states where the tri-
bal-state compacts call for regular state oversight, institute technical stan-
dards and testing protocols for gaming machines and establish internal
control requirements, the tribal-state compacts call for regular state over-
sight, institute technical standards and testing protocols for gaming ma-
chines and establish internal control requirements, the NIGC's oversight
role will be limited. This is the case, for example, in Arizona. Some states
[Vol. 17: p. 309
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Given each state's unique position on gambling and the provi-
sions of IGRA, it is not a surprising result that each state that com-
pacts with one or more tribes for Class III gaming uses different
levels of scrutiny for gambling regulation and imposes different re-
strictions. 47 There are states that have Class III gambling regulatory
law that provides careful and effective regulatory scrutiny. Other
states barely show an interest in gaming operations except to note
their share of gambling proceeds. 48 Thus, there are major Indian
Class III casinos operating with reliance on tribal regulation and
state oversight and, except for a review and approval of the compact
by the Secretary of the Interior, a very limited federal role. The
result is uneven regulation. 49
Moreover, the goal of economic opportunity through the oper-
ation of gambling has eluded the vast majority of tribes.50 The
promise of IGRA to the neediest of Indian tribes, that is, a promise
of maximum flexibility as to the current technology, simultaneous
games, and participation between and among reservations, has not
been kept. One of the reasons for this failure is the weak and now
completely outdated gaming division in IGRA.51 Attempting to im-
plement IGRA's statutory language, that is, to differentiate the most
recent bingo based gaming devices from a slot machine hobbles
tribes' efforts to make use of the latest and most lucrative gaming
such as Michigan and North Dakota, however, have assumed a minimal
regulatory role. In some cases, compacts have become little more than a
revenue sharing agreement between the state and the tribe. Conse-
quently, under circumstances where the states do not have a significant
regulatory presence, the NIGC must be in place to undertake a broader
range of oversight and enforcement activities.
Id.; see also Colo. River Indian Tribes v. the Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 466
F.3d. 134, 2006 U.S.App. Lexis 25980 (holding NIGC exceeded authority over
Class III gaming when seeking to audit Class III operation) available at http://
www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/PressReleases/PR20092005/tabid/159/Default.aspx
47. See IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (B) (providing Secretary of Interior, not
NIGC, to approve tribal/state compacts, before effective).
48. See Congressional Quarterly, supra note 43.
49. See id. at 7 ("Since the passage of IGRA, 232 tribes have executed Class III
compacts with 22 states and the allocation of regulatory responsibility, if addressed
at all, is as diverse as the states and the tribes that have negotiated them.").
50. See Congressional Quarterly, supra note 43.
51. See Regulations.gov, Docket Folder Summary, http://www.regulations.
gov/search/Regs/home.html#docketDetail?R=NIGC-2007-0011 (last visited March
30, 2010) (listing regulations and 148 responses from tribes to attempts by NIGC
to develop Classification regulations, i.e., regulations to differentiate Class II from
Class III gaming). The comments were generally opposed to the Classification
regulations and the proposal was later withdrawn. See NIGC Sets Aside Class II Clari-
fication, Nat'l INntAN GAMING COMM'N, http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/Press
Releases/PR92062008/tabid/839/Default.aspx (last visited March 30, 2010) (dis-
cussing Class II clarifications).
2010]
9
Cowan: You Can't Get There from Here: IGRA Needs Reinvention into a Rele
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
318 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 17: p. 309
devices (Class III). This confrontation between the law and the
technology is not an accident.
Today's gaming industry has responded to IGRA's ephemeral
terms with innovation. The industry has taken the irresistible chal-
lenge set up by IGRA's provisions or lack of provisions, to circum-
vent any effort to separate Class II from Class III on their way to
introducing the most entertaining and lucrative gaming devices
ever invented. New devices appeal to patrons with their themes,
graphics and music, and offer the rush of the fast play of a slot
machine. The most current devices have been deliberately de-
signed to make a differentiation between a Class II bingo device
with technological aids and a slot machine facsimile an exercise like
admiring the emperor's new clothes.
The well-meaning federal effort to pin down bedrock law as to
the essential elements of bingo, is one that perhaps even lawyers
would admit has been permanently and purposefully obfuscated by
directed engineering. As I. Nelson Rose, the law professor and emi-
nent writer on gaming law issues, said in reference to the techno-
logical squeeze of bingo into a slot machine in his article,
Technically Not Slot Machines, "There are too many interested parties
who want to, and need to, use modern technology to design around
outdated laws." 52
III. THE UNITED STATES GAMBLING ENVIRONMENT IN THE 1980s
A. The Tribes
By the early 1980's, some federal financial support of Indian
social programs had been reduced.53 Many tribes were suffering
financial hardships.54 As a means to provide tribal employment
and income, a few Indian tribes were operating low stakes or high
stakes bingo, or both, on Indian land.55 Primarily, these efforts at
gambling operations to provide economic opportunities for their
52. I. Nelson Rose, Technically Not Slot Machines (May 22, 2004), available at
http://rose.casinocitytimes.com/article/technically-not-slot-machines-1 1575
53. See H. R. 99-488, 99th Cong., (1986) ("The proliferation of tribal gaming
operations was also encouraged by President Reagan's Indian Policy Statement
which encouraged the tribes to reduce their dependence on federal funds by pro-
viding a greater percentage of the cost of their self-government.").
54. See INDIAN GAMING AND THE LAw, 21-8 (William R. Eadington ed., 1998).
55. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) ("Indian lands means-(A) All land within the lim-
its of an Indian reservation; and (B) Any lands title to which is either held in trust
by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any
Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against aliena-
tion and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.").
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members featured bingo and related games. 56 A few tribes offered
card games only, or a combination of bingo and cards games.57
There were no "full casino" gaming operations, meaning an opera-
tion that included slot machines and house-banked casino games,
as are known today in Indian Country.58
Congress was under considerable pressure from several states
to prohibit tribal-based gambling. In reaction to Indian gaming,
state governments took the position that state law should have juris-
diction on Indian lands within the state. The state governments
expressed that attitude in the form of litigation against the tribes
and their sovereignty.59 These states argued, among other posi-
tions, that tribal gaming enterprises would become infiltrated by
organized crime. A balance was needed between the states' con-
cerns and the tribes' interests in using gaming to promote eco-
nomic development on their reservations. 60
56. See id.
57. See id. at 4 ("In 1979, the Seminole Tribe in Florida won the right to offer
high stakes bingo.")
58. See INDIAN GAMING AND THE LAW, supra note 54, at 4 ("For the small num-
ber of tribes operating high stakes games, bingo, in 1988, brought in over 110
million in gross win."); see also S. Rpt. No. 99-493, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., Sept. 26,
1986, to accompany H.R. 1920 at 30-31.
59. See The Economics of Indian Gaming, NAT'L INDIAN GAMING ASS'N, http://
www.indiangaming.org/info/pr/press-releases-2009/
NIGA08EconImpactReport.pdf.
Today, Indian gaming is a visible exercise of the sovereign authority of
tribes. Tribal Sovereignty existed long before the first Europeans made
landfall on what subsequently became known as America. Indian nations
were actively governing their own citizens when the 13 colonies began
organizing what would become the United States. The U.S. Constitution
acknowledges Tribal Sovereignty in both the treaty and the Indian com-
merce clauses. Signed in 1778, the first United States treaty with an In-
dian nation affirmed the right of Tribal self-governance.
Id.
60. See generally Prygoski, supra note 41 and the accompanying text.
The Indian Commerce Clause (Article I, 8, clause 3) is the main source of
federal power over Indian tribes and has been the primary vehicle used
by Congress to recognize and define tribal sovereignty. In addition, the
Court has ruled that Congress, as the legislative body of the nation, has
an intrinsic power to deal with the Indian nations that reside within the
borders of the United States.
Presidential power over the Indian tribes is centered on the ability to
enter into treaties, a power that was used in the early years of federal
Indian law to secure tribal acquiescence to the demands of the encroach-
ing waves of European settlers. (In 1871, Congress passed legislation that
ended the practice of the United States entering into treaties with Indian
tribes.)
Prygoski, supra note 41.
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There was a disagreement among the circuits as to the imposi-
tion of state law on gaming on Indian reservations. 61 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the tribes that Indian sovereignty allowed such
gaming on Indian lands. 62 The Sixth Circuit did not.63 Litigation
on the subject, California et al. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians et
Al., was underway when the Congressional debate on the establish-
ment of a federal structure for Indian gaming began in the Ninety-
Eighth Congress in 1983.64
B. The States with Commercial Casinos
Both Nevada and New Jersey started gambling operations pur-
suant to an enacted gaming regulatory law with comprehensive and
expensive controls based on a two-tiered regulatory structure with
prosecutorial, judicial and quasi-legislative functions.65 With these
states as examples, other states wanted to enjoy state proceeds from
gambling. Eventually, more states legalized commercial gaming us-
ing a similar comprehensive regulatory scheme as deemed effective
in Nevada and New Jersey.66 The reasoning behind this considera-
ble regulatory effort was that since the commodity of gambling is
large amounts of cash, steadfast gaming regulation was required. 67
61. See California v. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); see also United States v.
Dakota, 796 F.2d 186 (6th Cir.1986). "In Dakota, the United States sought a de-
claratory judgment that a gambling business, also featuring the playing of black-
jack, poker, and dice, operated by two members of the Keweenaw Bay Indian
Community on land controlled by the community, and under a license issued by
the community, violated the [Organized Crime Control Act] OCCA. The Court of
Appeals held that the gambling business violated Michigan law and OCCA."
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202
62. See Cabazon v. California, 783 F.2d 900 (9th Cir.1986).
63. See id.
64. See S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 3 (1988), available at http://www.nigc.gov/Por-
tals/0/NIGC%2OUploads/readingroom/Senate%2ORept%20100-466.pdf.
65. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1; see also NEV. REV. STAT. Chapters 462-66; see
also NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.140 (1959).
66. An example of "comprehensive" gaming regulation is that, immediately
after passage, New Jersey's Casino Control Act required almost a thousand state
regulators in two different agencies, a regulator presence on the gaming floor
whenever the casino was opened, and employees in any position in a casino hotel,
even one as far removed from the casino floor as a dishwasher, had to have a
gaming credential which meant no convictions related to theft nor "moral turpi-
tude. All this regulated 12 casinos in one small town. Subsequently, these restric-
tions were eased.
67. See S. Rpt. No. 99-493, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., Sept. 26, 1986, to accompany
H.R. 1920, Minority Views, 32; see also Reid, Harry, The Indian Gaming Act and the
Political Process. Also see Dunstan, Roger, Gambling in California, January 1997, XI.
Gambling and Crime, CRB-97-003, available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/
03/Chaptl 1.html.
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The availability of cash, even in the best regulated jurisdictions, can
and sometimes will erupt into corruption and crime.
For the most part, the regulatory structure in legal state juris-
dictions, established as part of the state's law enforcement agencies
that could and would function as legal and operational law enforce-
ment, was expected to change as the environment of gaming
changed. 68 Since the initial adoption of a regulatory scheme, in
virtually every legislative session since the enactment of the regula-
tory laws, the statutes in New Jersey and Nevada have been
amended to address issues that arose in the ordinary course of busi-
ness and, most importantly, to respond to emerging technology and
market conditions. 69
The states' interests in commercial gaming, then dominated by
Nevada and New Jersey as the only legal jurisdictions, understood
that the outcome of the pending Cabazon litigation might cause
what they considered an unfair advantage for Native Americans.
Unless federal law provided otherwise, gambling operations that
took place on Indian land might avoid state tax. Because commer-
cial casinos had significant state taxes to pay for their right to oper-
ate in a state, commercial casino interests saw Indian gambling 70
without a state tax as unfair competition to their own operations. 71
68. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 2706 (2006) (noting original language of IGRA). The
original language of IGRA, as enacted, recognized this need for ongoing revision.
The IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2706(c) required a report with minority views to be filed
every two years that included recommendations for amendments to the Act. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 2051 (1972) (explaining how provision was excluded from IGRA in
1995 by Termination of Reporting Requirements Actas provided by § 239(a) of
such Act). The provision states:
a) Termination. (1) In general [Caution: See notes to this section for provi-
sions to which this paragraph does not apply.]. Subject to the provisions of
paragraph (2) of this subsection and subsection (d), each provision of
law requiring the submittal to Congress (or any committee of the Con-
gress) of any annual, semiannual, or other regular periodic report speci-
fied on the list described under subsection (c) shall cease to be effective,
with respect to that requirement ....
Id.
69. In conversation with author, Daniel Henegan, Public Information Officer
for New Jersey Casino Control Commission estimates that Casino Control Act,
adopted in 1976 has been amended at least 37 times by fulltime New Jersey
Legislature.
70. See Roger Dunstan, Gambling in California, January 1997, IV. Indian Gam-
ing, CRB-97-003, available at http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/Chapt4.html.
71. SeeJames Quinn, American's Gambling $100 Billion in Casino's Like Rats in a
Cage, THE MARKET ORACLE, Oct. 11, 2009, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/
Article14128.html.
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IV. CALIFORNIA ET AL. V. CABAZON BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
ET AL
In Cabazon, two Indian Tribes in California were conducting
reservation bingo games and poker and other card games that were
open to the public. California and local government sought to ap-
ply statutes governing the operation of bingo games and the play-
ing of draw poker and other card games to the tribal operation.
The Tribes filed an action for declaratory relief in Federal District
Court, which entered summary judgment for the Tribes, holding
that neither the State nor the county had any authority to enforce
its gambling laws within the reservations. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed. California filed an appeal. Both proponents and oppo-
nents of Indian gaming felt pressure to resolve their differences
and develop a federal Indian gaming plan before the Supreme
Court imposed one as the result of the pending litigation. None-
theless, the legislative stand-off was preventing a statutory solution.
The long-awaited Supreme Court Cabazon decision was handed
down on February 25, 1987.72 The Supreme Court held that unless
state law concerning gaming was prohibitory and criminal, not
merely regulatory and civil, state law did not preclude gaming on
Indian reservations. Therefore, Indian reservations were governed
by sovereign Indian law except for criminal state and federal law.
The Court stated: "to the extent that the State and county seek to
regulate short of prohibition, the laws are pre-empted since the as-
serted state interest is not sufficient to escape the pre-emptive force
of the federal and tribal interests apparent in this case." 73 The
Cabazon decision limited state control over Indian land. Unless
state law prohibited an activity entirely as criminal, rather than
merely regulating it, state law had no jurisdiction on Indian reserva-
tions.74 After Cabazon, if Utah, for example, prohibited all types of
gambling, even church bingo, it was clear that no type of gambling
could take place on Indian land in Utah. However, if California
allowed charity bingo gambling within the state to take place under
regulated circumstances, any Indian tribe in California could oper-
ate bingo on its Indian reservation regulated by tribal law.
72. Cabazon v. California, 783 F.2d 900 (9th Cir.1986).
73. Id. at 214-22.
74. See id. (explaining application of IGRA).The provisions of IGRA that re-
quire a tribal/state compact for Class III gambling establish the voluntary agree-
ment of the tribe to the application of certain state law. Id.
[Vol. 17: p. 309
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V. THE COMPROMISE
Congress adopted the IGRA, (P.L. 100-497), on Oct. 17,
1988. 75 The credit, or the blame depending on your point of view,
for the enacted IGRA, has been given to Senator Daniel K. Inouye
(D. Hawaii), DanielJ. Evans (R. Washington), Morris Udall (D. Ari-
zona), and Harry Reid (D. Nevada).76 The Act compartmentalizes
different forms of gamble based on a belief that certain forms of
gambling presented a greater danger to society than others. 77 In-
dian gambling was divided into Classes, I, II, and III. The idea was
to fit every category of gambling squarely within Class I or Class II,
or in the residual class, Class III.
75. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat.
2475 (1988).
76. See INDIAN GAMING AND THE LAW, supra note 54 at 7, 17, 23.
77. See 25 U.S.C.§ 2703. The definitions provides in pertinent part;
(6) The term "CLAss I GAMING" means social games solely for prizes of
minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by indi-
viduals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or
celebrations.
(7) (A) The term "CLASS II GAMING" means -
(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whether or not elec-
tronic, computer, or other technologic aids are used in connection there-
with) -
(I) which is played for prizes, including monetary prizes, with cards bear-
ing numbers or other designations,
(II) in which the holder of the card covers such numbers or designations
when objects, similarly numbered or designated, are drawn or electroni-
cally determined, and
(III) in which the game is won by the first person covering a previously
designated arrangement of numbers or designations on such cards, in-
cluding (if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip
jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo, and
(ii) card games that -
(I) are explicitly authorized by the laws of the State, or
(II) are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played at
any location in the State, but only if such card games are played in con-
formity with those laws and regulations (if any) of the State regarding
hours or periods of operation of such card games or limitations on wa-
gers or pot sizes in such card games.
(B) The term "CLASS II GAMING" does not include
(i) any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or black-
jack (21), or
(ii) electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or
slot machines of any kind.
(8) The term "CLASS III GAMING" means all forms of gaming that are not
Class I gaming or Class II gaming.
(9) The term "NET REVENUES" means gross revenues of an Indian gaming
activity less amounts paid out as, or paid for, prizes and total operating
expenses, excluding management fees.
25 U.S.C.§ 2703.
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Class I gaming is defined as social games solely for prizes of
minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by
individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or
celebrations that are not subject to IGRA.78 This Class I definition
and the provision in 25 U.S.C. 2710 (a) (1) that leaves this type of
gambling within the exclusive jurisdictions of the tribes has proved
to be the easiest of the categories to administrate since there has
not been any significant controversy as to what activities are in Class
I, nor what constitutes "minimum value." There are no proposals
herein to change Class I gambling or the tribes' exclusive jurisdic-
tion of that type of gambling.
The Class II definition and the language of 25 U.S.C.§ 2710
(a) (2) provide that this class of gaming is still under tribal jurisdic-
tion but subject to the provisions of the IGRA meaning that the
NIGC has responsibility for the enforcement of the provisions of
the IGRA that apply to Class II gambling. The IGRA definition at-
tempts to provide both what Class II gaming is and what Class II
gaming is not.
The affirmative requirements describe the game commonly
known at bingo in 1988 and even provides for the possible use of
technological aids for the playing of bingo. Section (111) of the
IGRA Class II definition muddies the water by naming other games
allowed if played in the same location as bingo, pull-tabs, lotto,
punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo and other "games similar to
bingo. ' 79 The IGRA also allows certain card games in the Class II
category if approved in the state, if played according to state laws
and regulations.80
The main feature of Class II Indian gaming is that it requires
no state approval for gaming, no compact, and no sharing of gam-
ing revenue with any state government. The tribe must adopted a
tribal gaming ordinance that approved by the Chairman of the
NIGC.8s The negative provisions of the ordinance resemble
grandfathering provisions, establishing that traditional casino
games banked by the house, electronic, or electromechanical fac-
78. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) (1988).
79. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2) (1988).
80. These are non-banked card games (such as poker and other card games
in which players bet against each other rather than against the house) and the
dealer (the "house") is not a player but collects a vigorish (a "vig") or percentage
of play from the players for providing the location, table and dealer.
81. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2) (1988) (asserting that chairman shall make de-
terminations for approving tribal ordinances for Class II gaming).
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol17/iss2/3
IGRA NEEDS REINVENTION
similes of any game of chance, or slot machines of any kind are not
Class II gaming.82
Legal Class III gambling is different. The tribe and the state
must negotiate a compact concerning the nature and extent of the
Class III gaming the tribe intends to conduct, and the manner in
which that gaming will be regulated. The compact must be ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Interior through the Gaming Office
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The IGRA imposes upon states a duty to negotiate in good
faith with Indian tribes to form Class III gaming compacts. The Act
originally contained a provision allowing tribes to sue noncomp-
liant states in federal court to force good faith negotiations. In
1996 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, struck down that provision
in the case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.83 This case found
that Congress did not have the authority, in regards to compact
negotiations to allow tribes to sue states in federal court without the
states' consent. Currently, if states do not negotiate in good faith,
tribes may resort to other remedies, including petitioning the Sec-
retary of the Interior to approve the tribes' Class III gaming
activities. 84
As adopted, IGRA allows tribes to engage in gambling opera-
tions in Indian lands so long as the lands were acquired in trust by
the Secretary of the Interior for the tribe before October 17, 1988,
the date of the Act's enactment. 85 However, it imposes restrictions
82. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (C)-(F) (stating specific provisions excluding cer-
tain states and time periods from regulation based on their prior history of gaming
in this area); 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (B) (i) (excluding banking card games for defini-
tion of Class II gaming); 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(ii) (providing Class II gaming can
allow card games "explicitly authorized" under state law).
83. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding congress cannot abrogate state's immu-
nity from suit unless state consents to be sued, this power is not within Indian
Commerce Clause of the Constitution). See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating
Indian commerce clause).
84. See § 2710 (d) (7) (B) (authorizing cause of action if states do not negoti-
ate in good faith 180 days after attempting such negotiation).
85. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988) (noting declaration of Policy). Only federally
recognized tribes have the right to operate casinos and to conduct other gaming
activities under the IGRA. See id. Indian groups that are not officially recognized
by the United States government do not have rights under the IGRA, nor do indi-
vidual Indians. See id.
(5) The term "INDIAN TRBE" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or
other organized group or community of Indians which -
(A) is recognized as eligible by the Secretary for the special programs and
services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians, and
(B) is recognized as possessing powers of self-government. (emphasis
added).
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on two of the most important aspects of gambling. First, the form
of the gambling, and second the usage of proceeds. 86 IGRA also
provides for regulatory authority at various levels of scrutiny. Three
different government sovereigns are responsible for this review de-
pending on the type of gaming. They are: the tribal government
independently, tribal government with federal oversight, and tribal
government in conjunction with state government through tribal
compact. The resulting state regulation varies depending on the
specific agencies that each state brings to its compact negotiations.
In limited situations, legislators even require input from local gov-
ernment and neighboring tribal governments. 8 7 In addition, fed-
eral agencies are involved with Indian gaming oversight.88
A. You Don't Want to Watch Sausage or Legislation Being Made
Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, a legislator who was opposed to
the Indian gaming by his own admission, authored a controversial
provision of the bill that requires compacts to operate Class III ca-
sino gaming on Indian land.89 Senator Reid, when discussing
which attributes of IGRA were vital to passage the statute, referred
to the categorizing of different types of gambling into classes as a
straight forward, uncomplicated effort. He said:
There were two basic questions: how should different
types of gaming operations be categorized or classified,
25 U.S.C. § 2703; see also 25 U.S.C. §2719(a) (discussing limitation and exceptions
to Indian land being used for gaming). For a further discussion of the condition
under which Indian land can be used for gaming, see supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text.
86. See § 2710(b) (2) (B) (establishing how IGRA restricts purposes for which
gambling proceeds may be used). The revenues generated by Indian gambling
enterprises must be used only for purposes designated in the IGRA. See id. (noting
restrictions on purpose of gambling). They can fund tribal government opera-
tions, provide for the general welfare of the tribe, promote tribal economic devel-
opment, make donations to charitable organizations and to fund the operations of
local government. See id. (stating allowed use of revenue).
87. See 25 U.S.C. § 2718(b) (1997) (providing exceptions to general provision
in section (a) that prohibits gambling on Indian Lands acquired after date of pas-
sage of IGRA, October 17, 1988).
88. See 25 U.S.C. § 2713(a)(1) (1988) (noting IGRA placing authority to en-
force provisions of IGRA in National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC)). The
NIGC is an independent agency in the Department of the Interior. See
§ 2710(b) (2) (B), (b) (3) (providing IGRA exception to approved purposes of gam-
bling proceeds for per capita distributions to tribal members if distribution takes
place pursuant to evaluated distribution plan that has been approved by Office of
Gaming, Bureau of Indian Affairs, (BIA)).
89. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-488, infra note 92 at 18 (quoting Harry Reid speaking
at North American Conference on Status of Indian Gaming held at University of
Nevada, Reno, in 1997); see also Reid, supra note 67.
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and what is the appropriate level of regulation for each
class? Some discussions were relatively simple. Tradi-
tional Indian games of chance were to be left to the sole
control of the Indian government. Also, bingo, with
which Indian gaming operators have had years of experi-
ence, was to be left primarily in Indian hands as well with
some federal oversight.
Other decisions were certainly more complicated .... It
was understood that the Cabazon decision dealt directly
with poker games on Indian lands, so percentage card
games were included in Class II activities along with bingo.
On the other hand it was generally agreed that casino style
card games such as blackjack and baccarat, along with
pari-mutuel betting and other casino style gambling in-
cluding video and slot machines, should be subject to a
tighter regulation required under Class III gaming
operations.90
As demonstrated by Senator Reid's comments, and common
understanding, bingo is easy to categorize. Bingo did not need a
complicated regulatory structure. The simple nature of the game
and the experience many tribes had in operating bingo parlors lead
to a generic understanding of bingo from childhood. 91 There was
little to no debate, however, about the elements of bingo, or the
circumstances under which it was played, making it presumptively a
more benign activity than other casino gaming.92 Presumably,
there was a sufficiently common, and perhaps nostalgic, under-
standing of the difference between bingo and a slot machine. Leg-
islators considered bingo as static; an easy element in the midst of
the many difficult challenges to come in achieving a regulatory
structure for Indian gaming. Slot machines, however, were only
available in association with casinos, and were, thus, thought of as
demanding higher regulatory vigilance as a more socially danger-
ous type of gambling.93 In reality, because slot machines are the
90. Reid, supra note 67.
91. SeeJoseph L. Lester, B-I-N-G-NO! The Legal Abuse of an Innocent Game, 18 ST.
THoMAs L. REv. 21, 25 (2005) (explaining evolving technology surrounding elec-
tronic bingo and how it has come to be dissimilar from traditional bingo).
92. See generally Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat.
2567 (1988) (regulating gaming on Indian land); Sen. Rep. No. 99-493 (1986)
(Conf. Rep.) (describing Indian gaming regulation); H. R. Rep. No. 99-488 (1986)
(Conf Rep.); 134 Cong. Rec. 24016, 24016-37 (1988) (noting Indian gaming
guidelines); 134 Cong. Rec. 25367-81 (1988) (discussing Indian gaming).
93. See NIGC, 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (1993)
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most lucrative form of gambling commercial gaming interests were
concerned with protecting their exclusivity.
Despite all the reported conflicts and pressures on Congress
from the various interest involved, the IGRA passed without debate
on the Senate floor.94 Professor Thompson described how IGRA
came to pass without debate on the Senate floor:
[T]he making of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was
typical of the worst kind of legislation. Most of the mem-
bers of Congress were not involved in the process and they
were quite happy not to be involved, either because the
bill did not affect their state (or so they thought) or they
sensed that conflict pressures coming from Indian inter-
ests, rival commercial gaming interests, state governments
and law enforcement officials made it a no-win situation
Once on the Senate floor, the major portion of the bill -
the major controversial provision - was added by an
amendment without debate. That provision authored by
Senator Harry Reid (D-Nevada) authorized the establish-
ments of Indian tribe-state compacts for regulating Class
III gaming on reservations. The senators, not wishing to
burden their colleagues with dilemmas of decision-mak-
ing, managed to maneuver the bill into a special status (by
process of unanimous consent - therefore no expressed
objection) whereby it could pass on a voice vote, a vote
Class III gaming means all forms of gaming that are not Class I gaming or
Class II gaming, including but not limited to:
(a) Any house banking game, including but not limited to -
(1) Card games such as baccarat, chemin de fer, blackjack (21), and pai
gow (if played as house banking games);
(2) Casino games such as roulette, craps, and keno;
(b) Any slot machines as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a) (1) and elec-
tronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance;
(c) Any sports betting and pari-mutuel wagering including but not lim-
ited to wagering on horse racing, dog racing or jai alai; or
(d) Lotteries.
Id.
94. See 134 Cong. Rec. 25369, 25376 (1988)
(The SPEAKER pro tempore). The question is on the motion offered by
the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Udall] that the House suspend the
rules and pass the Senate bill (S. 555) on which the yeas and nays are
ordered. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were - yeas
323, nays 84, not voting 24, as follows: So (two-thirds having voted in
favor thereof) the rules were suspended, and the Senate bill was passed.
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without individual senators having to go on the record
Congress has given us the Act and now they talk about fol-
lowing its intent. There was no intent except to duck re-
sponsibility and produce something that looks like a
decision. The law delegates and defers real decision-mak-
ing; it is so vague and empty in parts that litigants, lawyers
and judges will have little to guide them toward final reso-
lutions of just what our national policy on Indian gaming
should be ....
In the House of Representatives there were no committee
hearings on the bill and it too received a non-recorded
vote of passage. Final congressional action on the bill
took place in the Senate just two hours before the 100th
Congress ended.95
VI. IGRA GivEs AND IGRA TAKEs AWAY
In a report on the then pending IGRA bill, Senator Daniel K.
Inouye, (D. Hawaii), wrote:
[T]he Committee intends in section 4(8XA) (i) that tribes
have maximum flexibility to utilize games such as bingo and
lotto for tribal economic development. The Committee
specifically rejects any inference that tribes should restrict
Class II games to existing games sizes, levels of participa-
tion, or current technology. The Committee intends that
tribes be given the opportunity to take advantage of mod-
ern methods of conducting Class II games and the lan-
guage regarding technology is designed to provide
maximum flexibility. In this regard, the Committee recog-
nizes that tribes may wish to join with other tribes to coor-
dinate their Class II operations and thereby enhance the
potential of increasing revenues. For example, linking
participant players at various reservations whether in the
same or different States, by means of telephone, cable, tel-
evision or satellite may be a reasonable approach for tribes
to take. Simultaneous games, participation between and
among reservations can be made practical by use of com-
puters and telecommunications technology .... 96
95. See INDIAN GAMING AND THE LAw, supra note 54.
96. S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 9 (1988) (emphasis added).
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The language in the quote by Senator Inouye denoting "maxi-
mum flexibility" is an express rejection of restrictions on Class II
games as it pertains to existing games. The sizes, levels of participa-
tion, current or future technology, the running of simultaneous
games, and participation between and among Indian reservations,
all encourage Indian gaming.
Bingo restrictions are mentioned in the same report. [A]s
long as the use of such technology does not change the
fundamental characteristics of the bingo or lotto
games.... In other words, such technology would merely
broaden the potential participation levels and is readily dis-
tinguishable from the use of electronic facsimiles in which a
single participant plays a game with or against a machine
rather than with or against other players.97
The drafters of the IGRA gave "technological aids" to Class II
bingo and took away "facsimiles." This was done ignorant of the
fact that technology progressed to the point where an "aid" to
bingo can be substantially the same as a facsimile of a slot machine.
The term "readily distinguishable" in the legislative history as it ap-
plies to the difference between bingo and slot machines denotes
that, when drafting of the IGRA, ordinary reasonable patrons could
tell the difference between bingo machines and slot machines with-
out the Ninth Circuit's legal opinion.98
A. Traditional Bingo
At the time of IGRA's passage, bingo followed traditional game
norms. Players played one game at a time, most often against nu-
merous competing players, and were limited by the availability and
size of rooms. Players used paper cards and sat at long tables. The
game was to manually "cover" the numbers which were randomly
chosen by a ball blower. The numbers were "called" until a winner
covered all the numbers in a pre-established pattern on the card
and declared "Bingo" to win.99 Player involvement consisted of a
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See United States v. 103 Elec. Gambling Devices, 223 F.3d 1091, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that whereas Johnson act forbids facsimiles of games of
chance, "mere technological aids" to bingo do not qualify).
99. See Free Library, Types of Bingo Games, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
Types+of+Bingo+Games-a01073778467 (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (describing how
bingo is played); see also I. Nelson Rose, Bingo -without the B,I,N,G or 0, GAMBLING
AND THE LAw, available at http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/bingo.htmi (last
visited April 9, 2010) (describing electronically aided bingo).
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serious of actions, a pattern different than the way people concep-
tualize playing a slot machine.
No person could play bingo alone. The competition among
the players was as an indispensible aspect of the game. For exam-
ple, a winning pattern could lose its priority if the player "failed" to
call bingo. The game was slow because multiple numbers had to be
called before a winner was found and when bingo was called play
was stopped so the win could be verified.
B. Traditional Slot Machines
Slot machines used to be stand alone boxes operated solely by
the electro-mechanical components contained in the box. The
player wagered and played against the gaming operator through
the machine. A player competition was not necessary to play a slot
machine. The only action required by a player was to feed money
into the machine and pull or push an interface to activate the
game. Play was over after one action and the player set the tempo
of the game subject to restraints by the machine.
C. Current Bingo
In bingo facilities, paper cards have been traded for conve-
nient electronic aids. These resemble up-right video screens that
display bingo cards and other innovations and are called technolog-
ical aids.100 In other similar operations, the game of bingo is no
longer recognizable in any traditional sense. 1° 1
The newest Class II electronic bingo games are programmed
with mathematical calculations to mimic Class III slot machines. 10 2
Industry sources claim that game winning patterns occur continu-
100. See, IGT.com, What makes Class III machines different from Class III
slots?, https://www.igt.com/Content/base.asp?pid=8.17.36.243 (last visited Mar.
31, 2010) (describing technological aids as they differentiate electronic bingo to
resemble slot machine versus traditional bingo, this will differentiate from Class III
standards allowing use in Class II gambling establishments).
101. See I. Nelson Rose, Is it Bingo or a Slot Machine, 7 GAMING L. REv. 2 (2003)
available at http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/abs/10.1089/1092188033216296
63?prevSearch=allfield%253A%2528%252C%2BI.%2BNelson%252C%2BIs%2Bit
%2BBingo%2Bor%2Ba%2BSlot%2BMachine%252C%2B7%2BGaming%2BLaw
%2BReview%2B2%2529&searchHistoryKey=. (describing transformation of
Bingo).
102. FRANK LEGATO, THE REEL DEAL: CLASS II: Is IT FAR?, http://www.casino
player.com/archive/0602cp/reel.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing
mathematically programmed bingo games which closely resemble slot machines);
see Lester, supra note 91, at 31-32 (highlighting similarities between marketing fac-
tors of bingo-slots and regular slots, as well as similar additive nature of both ma-
chines, and concluding difference between Class II and Class III games is moot).
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ously, about every twenty milliseconds. Anyone pushing the play
button within that window is put in a game for a common ball draw.
Every ball draw results in at least one winning bingo pattern. Play-
ers may complete a game with substantially less time and action
than traditional bingo. Cover and calling a winning pattern can be
automatic, without any direct player action. However, a few rem-
nants of traditional bingo remain. There must be at least two play-
ers with no upper limit on the number of players.10 3 The bingo
slots, as an alternative to rolling pictures and symbols accompanied
by music and noise, have the option to display a bingo card (al-
though the slot machine-like graphics are much flashier and more
appealing than a simple bingo card). The devices are manufac-
tured and presented to players as bingo. They are classified as tech-
nological aids in Class II facilities, without a tribal-state compact.
Contained in supplementary information, published attendant
to proposed regulation changes in 2007, then-Chairman Hogen of
the NIGC described the circumstances:
Currently, the distinction between an electronic 'aid' to a
Class II game and an 'electronic facsimile' of a game of
chance, and therefore a Class III game, is often unclear.
With advances in technology, the line between the two has
blurred. When in IGRA, Congress defined 'the game of
chance commonly known as bingo,' 25 U.S.C. 2703(7) (A),
it could not have foreseen the technological changes that
would affect all games of chance. Likewise, by allowing
electronic aids to the game of bingo, Congress could not
103. See National Indian Gaming Commission, 25 C.F.R. § 502.7 (1992) (ex-
plaining when something is electronic computer of technological aid). This crite-
rion is met when "[it] [i]s not a game of chance but merely assists a player or the
playing of a game ... [i]s readily distinguishable from the playing of a game of
chance on an electronic or electromechanical facsimile; and . . . [i]s operated
according to applicable Federal communications law." Id; see also National Indian
Gaming Commission, 25 C.F.R. §502.8 (1992) (defining electronic or elec-
tromechanical facsimile).
Electronic or electromechanical facsimile means a game played in an
electronic or electromechanical format that replicates a game of chance
by incorporating all of the characteristics of the game, except when, for
bingo, lotto, and other games similar to bingo, the electronic or elec-
tromechanical format broadens participation by allowing multiple players
to play with or against each other rather than with or against a machine.
Id.; see also National Indian Gaming Commission, 25 C.F.R. § 502.9 (1992).
Other games similar to bingo .. .game played in the same location as
bingo (as defined in 25 USC 2703(7) (A) (i)) constituting a variant on the
game of bingo, provided that such game is not house banked and permits
players to compete against each other for a common prize or prizes.
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have foreseen that some vendors and gaming operators
would be unable or unwilling to distinguish between Class
II games, which tribes regulate, and Class III facsimiles,
which require compacts between tribes and states. The
Commission is concerned that the industry is dangerously
close to obscuring the line between Class II and Class III.
It believes that the future success of Indian gaming under
IGRA depends upon tribes, states, and manufacturers be-
ing able to recognize when games fall within the ambit of
tribal-state compacts and when they do not.10 4
However clearly the NIGC understands the challenges
presented by IGRA, the agency is bound to implement its less than
clear provisions. Despite efforts by the NIGC to maintain the origi-
nal but hapless statutory integrity in the segregation of gaming clas-
ses, enforcement litigation, and attempted regulatory amendment;
increasingly complex legal analysis has not resolved ongoing con-
flicts. In testimony before the House Natural Resources Commit-
tee, Chairman Hogen discussed NIGC enforcement against the
proliferation of what the agency considers un-compacted and there-
fore, illegal, Class III games:
I realized that the effort was unsuccessful .... By its na-
ture, the enforcement actions were brought against a par-
ticular tribe for playing particular un-compacted Class III
games. I discovered that after all of the litigation was said and
done, as soon as NIGC succeeded in demonstrating that a partic-
ular machine was in fact a Class III gambling machine, a ma-
chine with similar operating characteristics but a different name
and cosmetic appearance would show up, and we would have to
begin all over again with expensive and time consuming litiga-
tion. This employed lawyers, but it didn't help the tribes ....
Class II was the basis on which Indian gaming was built.
Although an estimated 90% of this gross gaming revenue
is generated by compacted Class III gaming, Class II re-
mains significant to tribes throughout the country....
Tribes play Class II games for a variety of reasons. For
some tribes with Class III gaming compacts, Class II is a
vital supplement, long enjoyed and preferred by some cli-
entele. In other cases, some states refuse to compact with
their tribes for Class III play, even though they allow Class
104. National Indian Gaming Commission, 72 Fed. Reg. 60483-01 (proposed
Oct. 24 2007) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. §§ 502-46).
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III gaming activities elsewhere within those states or toler-
ate wide-spread illegal Class III activities in non-Indian
Class II games gaming facilities. Tribes in that situation
are left to make the most of Class II gaming....
When the equipment automatically, electronically auto-
mates the play of the game and the players' participation
in the game, the Commission believes that the play is no
longer "outside" the equipment and that the electronic
equipment can no longer be characterized as merely an
aid. All player attention, discretion, and interface have
been automated by the equipment. 10 5
VII. ONE EXAMPLE: METLAKATLA
The Metlakatla Indian Community in remote southeastern
Alaska operates a small Class II gaming facility which is a source of
revenue and jobs for the Community. 106 Ferry or airplane is the
only way to access the Community of 1,469 persons. Unemploy-
ment ranges from fifty to eighty percent, higher than neighboring
communities due to dependence on seasonal industries such as
lumber and fishing.'0 7 Revenue from the Class II gaming operation
funds essential tribal services. The State of Alaska and the tribe
have not been able to negotiate a Class III tribal/state compact. 10 8
In spring of 2008, the Metlakatla Tribal Council believed an
auto-cover feature, which automatically performs the action of cov-
ering the called-number in an electronic bingo game, qualified as a
Class II bingo game. They also believed that linking their games to
other Indian gaming locations would generate more income, create
more jobs, and fund more essential tribal services. Consequently,
they passed a resolution amending its previously approved gaming
105. Committee on House Natural Resources (2008), Statement of Philip N.
Hogen, Chairman National Indian Gaming Commission, available at 2008 WL
467829 (emphasis added).
106. See In Re: Amendment to Metlakatla Indian Community's Gaming Ordi-
nance, 1, available at http://www.hobbsstraus.com/uploads/file/
Metlakatla.NIGC.Appeal.Brief.pdf (describing Metlakatla Indians) [hereinafter
Metlakatla Brief].
107. See U.S. Department of Agriculture Information on the Metlakatla Com-
munity, http://wvw.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/ezec/communit/metlakaia.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing Metlakatla Indians); Jerry Reynolds, Metlakatla
Decision Still Haunts NIGC Chairman, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 12, 2010, http://
www.indiancountrytoday.com/politics/27096599.html (describing Chairman Phil
Hogen's comments as Chairman of National Indian Gaming Commission).
108. See Metlakatla Brief, supra note 106, at 1 (describing importance of gam-
ing to sustainability of tribe).
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ordinance, Resolution No. 08-24, to allow an automatic num-
ber-cover, called a "dab feature," when a number comes up.1°9
A submission was made to the NIGC for an amendment.
Chairman Hogen denied the approval, declaring that the proposed
amendment would create a "wholly electronic, fully automated
game." 110 If this language is true, then this is not bingo under
IGRA. Nor is it a "games similar to bingo.""' Therefore, it cannot
operate without a compact. The Community appealed to the full
Commission, but subsequently withdrew this appeal. 112
Although the brief artfully avoids the issue, the underlying dif-
ficulty with the amendment was that all the game activity occurred
with a single touch of a single button by the player. The device
electronically determined the numbers, auto-dabbed the numbers
and announced the game results. NIGC classification regulations
proposed in 2007 that this one-touch characteristic be determina-
tive when distinguishing between slot-machines and bingo-ma-
chines. Given the negative reception generated by the proposed
standards, this simple "bright-line" classification was withdrawn. 113
In the Metlakatla case, the NIGC's efforts to draw a line between
definitions of what constitutes bingo or a slot machine is equitable
to Don Quixote's battle with the windmills. The nature of IGRA
itself has defeated the tribe before they even attempted to amend
their gaming ordinance. 1 4
109. See id. at 2 (passing resolution to clarify term "auto-dub," feature de-
signed to track player's electronic bingo card).
110. Id. at 13.
111. Id. (quoting 25 C.F.R. § 502.8).
112. See National Indian Gaming Commission, NGIC Announces Metlakatla
Withdrawal, http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/PressReleases/PressReleases-
Main/PR98082008/tabid/876/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (announc-
ing withdrawal of gaming appeal noting commission plans to conduct cost benefit
study on issues herein).
113. See National Indian Gaming Commission, NIGC Sets Aside Class II Classi-
fication, Definition Regulations, http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/Press-
Releases/PR92062008/tabid/839/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2010)
(announcing withdrawal of proposed regulations).
114. See Committee on House Natural Resources, supra note 105.
Class III slot machines earn more than Class It games do industry-wide.
In Oklahoma, the economic impact study finds that Class III games, on
average, earn $145 per day and Class II games $125. That $20-a-day dif-
ference is significant. Our own calculations show that a tribe that con-
verts 20% of its Class II games to Class III games each year for the next
five years will be millions of dollars ahead, even counting the retail cost of
new equipment and additional revenue sharing with the State.
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VIII. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO IGRA
I suggest IGRA should be amended to put into action the fol-
lowing policies:
First, the attempt to maintain that bingo and slot machines are
different should be abandoned. It is not possible to police such a
requirement. Technology has all but erased any tangible difference
and it is waste of resources and a burden on the judicial economy to
continue to attempt to implement the existing requirement.
Second, because Class II casinos do not require tribes to pay
state governments, so long as they acquiesce to some federal over-
sight, the current Class II classification should be maintained.
Third, the difference between a Class II casino and a Class III
casino should be based on the financial size of the gaming opera-
tion. The NIGC already uses a financial tier system to assess fees.
This same criterion could be used to distinguish between Class II
and Class III operations. 115
Fourth, there should be a presumption of eligibility for self-
regulation.'1 6 Any Class II casino in operation for three years with-
out a major regulatory violation is a category already available in
IGRA. This would result in a larger Class II category than there
presently exists. The only difference is a portion would be self reg-
ulating. A new un-compacted casino would receive federal over-
sight for three years and then, a rebuttable presumption of the
capability for self regulation should arise absent a major
violation. 117
Fifth, when deciding if in this three year probationary period
there has been a major regulatory breach only material violation
should be considered. By material, I mean all violations except for
violations regarding the timeliness of filing.
Sixth, state regulation should be harmonized by providing a
minimum standard. Further, approval of tribal-state gaming com-
pacts should be the responsibility of the NIGC, not the Department
of the Interior.
115. See National Indian Gaming Commission 25 C.F.R. § 514.1 (discussing
how NIGC already uses financial based system to categorize casinos into tiers 1-3
for purpose of assessing fees).
116. See Grand Ronde Gaming Commission, http://www.grandrondegaming.
org/achievements.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (announcing that after 21 years
of IGRA Grand Ronde in Oregon, which operates Class II facility, received "self-
regulation" status).
117. See National Indian Gaming Commission, 25 C.F.R. § 518.1 (1998)
(describing who may petition for self regulation).
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Finally, the Johnson Act should be amended to allow gaming
devices at Class II casinos.
IX. CONCLUSION
The legislative history supports advanced technology in elec-
tronic bingo and condemns the "readily distinguishable standard."
The difference between a slot machine and electronic bingo de-
vices is not in any practical sense "readily distinguishable." Moreo-
ver, neither state nor federal officials have been successful in
preventing slot-like electronic bingo devices from operating in the
absence of a tribal-state compact. 118
A system of classifying Indian casino gaming which better
maintains the balance of power between federal, tribal and, state
authorities must be developed. The majority of tribes have only
seen moderate or little economic development under IGRA. For
these tribes, the structure of Class II gaming must be maintained.
The current definition of Class II gaming, however, should not. In-
dian gaming has grown into an annual $26.7 billion dollar busi-
ness. 119 Although the vast majority of this gross gaming revenue is a
result of compacted Class III gaming, Class II gaming still has an
important role to play.120 The ability to operate un-compacted and
newly-established games as quantitative Class II gaming may be the
only hope for some tribes to benefit from gambling.
118. See National Governor's Association, The Role of States, the Federal Gov-
ernment, and Indian Tribal Governments with Respect to Indian Gaming and Tax-
ation Issues, http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.8358ec82f5b198dl
8a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=2caa9e2flb09lOlOVgnVCM100000laO001aRCRD
&vgnextchannel=4b18fO74fOd9ff0OVgnVCM100000la01010aRCRD (last visited
Mar. 31, 2005) (noting governors policy 6.2.4 asserting importance of state-tribal
compacts and that congress should increase federal regulation to enforce these).
119. See Posting of Gabe Galanda to Northwest Indian Law and Business Advi-
sor, http://www.nwindianbusinesslawblog.com/articles/tribal-economic-develop-
ment/, Jun. 15, 2009 (analyzing growth in Indian gaming industry).
120. See Committee on House Natural Resources, supra note 105 (noting that
diversity of option for tribes is beneficial, this is characteristic of Class II versus
Class III option).
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